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INTRODUCTION

In one of Professor Vagts' articles reviewing the publications on multinational enterprises, a field which in 1982 merited a 426-page catalog
by the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,' he observes that European - particularly German - and United States legal
writers have approached the phenomenon of multinational enterprise
differently. 2 He noted that the more "case-oriented, pragmatic" commentators in the United States, who assume that multinationals are of such
fundamental importance to the international economy that the law
should treat them as "roughly equivalent to states," tend to advocate control by "rules parallel to those of [P]ublic [I]nternational [L]aw."' Their
"theoretical and abstract" German colleagues, 4 however, evince more
concern with Private International Law questions, such as the recognition of foreign corporations and the choice of law governing corporate
affairs.
The different approaches are less attributable to the dissimilarities between their legal systems than to structural particularities of the economic and political environment in Europe. While the integration of
multinational enterprises in an economic community without a uniform
business law provides easy access to the economies of the member states,
it also poses a host of complicated Private International Law problems.
These problems do not arise in the United States largely because its corporate law has long and consistently adhered to the place of incorporation theory.'
Although the EEC-Draft Code of Principles for Multinational Enterprises and Governments 7 and the impact of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises" on the settlement of European employment

1. Vagts, Foreword to C.D. WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE at vii (1982).

2. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A Ten Years' Review, 25 DIE AKTiENGESELLSCHAFT 154, 156-58 (1980).
3. Id. at 157.

4. Id.
5.

Id. at 156.

6. Id.
7. Draft Code of Principles for Multinational Enterprises and Governments, 20 O.J.
Eul. COMM. (No. C 118), at 16-21 (1977) (annex to the resolution of the European
Parliament dated Apr. 19, 1977, "on principles to be observed by enterprises and governments in international economy activity").
8. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise, OECD Doc. PRESS/A(76) 20 (1976), reprintedin Wakkie, Some
Comments on the Impact of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on
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disputes9 show that since the late 1970s Western Europe has shifted toward quasi-Public International Law regulations, 10 Professor Vagts' remarks are still largely valid and act as an incentive for the re-examination of the Private International Law approach. Assuming that each host
state seeks to maximize the benefits and minimize the adverse effects that
the activities of the multinational enterprises might have on the host
state's realization of its political, economic and social goals, the optimal
legal policy vis-A-vis multinationals is one which offers a control mechanism that is effective, yet which does not impose unnecessary restraints
on corporate behavior.
This Article explores the different approaches taken by the academic
and judicial communities of Germany and the United States in their respective attempts to derive the optimal legal policy to deal with the multinational enterprise phenomenon. It attempts to assess the success of the
Private International Law method as applied in most European countries by examining whether its criteria are operational and a reflection of
economic reality. The Article also analyzes whether application of such
criteria ensures the enforcement of the policies of the forum. It concludes
by questioning whether the Private International Law approach is a viable alternative to the Public International Law approach.
II.

PLACE OF INCORPORATION V. EFFECTIVE SEAT THEORY

The area of law governing the corporate affairs of multinational enterprises traditionally has been the battlefield of two theoretical concepts.
The Anglo-American conflict of laws adheres to the incorporation theory, which is based upon the concept that a corporation should abide by
the law of the country from which it derives its existence without regard
to its contacts with a second country. The doctrine originated in Great
Britain during the eighteenth century. Great Britain intended for the
doctrine to permit the "export" of British law to its colonies, and to
provide both certainty of law as well as enforcement of the corporation's
interests when such interests conflicted with those of the host state. Even
today, the incorporation theory principally works to facilitate the activities of powerful investors in foreign markets. 1
European Employment Relations, 2 Loy. L.A.

INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 75, 94-103

(1979).
9. See, e.g., R. BLANPAIN, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND LABOUR RELATIONS 1976-1979 (1979); Wakkie, supra note 8, at 75.
10. The EEC draft code and the OECD guidelines are evidence of a developing
trend among European governments to treat multinational enterprises like states.
11.

C.T. EBENROTH, DIE VERDECKTEN VERMOGENSZUWENDUNGEN IM TRANSNA-
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The effective seat theory is of more recent origin. It was developed
mainly in France and Germany during the nineteenth century12 and, in
fact, it merely varies the incorporation theory by adding the requirement
of domicile to that of incorporation." Accordingly, this theory recognizes
that a corporation's legal existence begins upon its incorporation under
the law of the state in which its seat is located. The corporate seat concept has been defined in two alternative ways. The first regards the corporation as centered at the place at which it "carries on the manufacturing, trading, or other activities indicated in [its] charter [si~ge
d'exploitation].' 14 The second focuses on the corporation's place of central administration, that is the place from which its operations are directed and its policy controlled (sibge rel, siage social).15
Although France applied the first corporate seat theory initially,1"
most Continental-European countries now regard the site of the corporate headquarters as the determining factor in locating the corporation. 17
It remains unclear, however, whether the meeting place of the directors
or that of the shareholders should be considered as the place of central
administration. In fact, the flexibility of the multinational enterprise requires the consideration of various factors in order to avoid results which
do not reflect economic reality. Therefore, courts of the same country
may operate with different criteria, depending upon the facts of each
particular case.1 8 The effective seat concept assumes that the state of central administration is the one primarily affected by the activities of the
corporation, and that it should be able to protect its legitimate interests
by applying its own law to the corporation's activities. Thus, compared
with the theory of incorporation, the effective seat concept is rather "defensive" in its rejection of the exportation of foreign law to host states.
The incorporation theory's flexibility is both its primary strength and
354-55 (1979).
Staudinger-Grossfeld, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht, in 2A STAUDINGERS
KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, para. 18 (10th & 11th eds. 1981)
[hereinafter STAUDINGER-GROSSFELD]. For an historical overview, see B. GROSSFELD,
PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS 26-40 (1975).
13. 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 33, 38 (2d ed.
1960).
14. Id. at 40.
15. Id. at 40-46.
16. See id. at 40.
17. See STAUDINGER-GROSSFELD, supra note 12, para. 120 (discussing the theory
applicable in various Continental-European countries).
18. See Hadari, The Choice of National Law Applicable to the MultinationalEnterprise and the Nationality of Such Enterprises, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1, 8-9; see also R.
PENNINGTON, COMPANIES IN THE COMMON MARKET 98-99 (2d ed. 1970).
TIONALEN UNTERNEHMEN

12.
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most significant weakness. An enterprise's freedom to choose the law of
any country to govern its corporate affairs, without also being required
to have any real contact with the country of incorporation and without
having to confront the problem of its recognition as a legal entity by the
states in which it conducts its business activities, guarantees to the enterprise a great deal of entrepreneurial choice and certainty of law.
The unlimited "freedom to choose," however, also can be misused to
circumvent unpleasant laws of the host state. This goal is achievable
without resort to incorporation in "exotic" countries like the Bahamas,
Curagao or Andorra. Incorporation in a country whose law is relatively
more permissive than the law of the host state under the corporate seat
theory is enough to grant the enterprise an unfair advantage over domestic competitors. The German law of workers' "co-determination" is a
notable example of a statute which might be circumvented. 19 Since some
European laws do not include similar provisions, an enterprise that is
effectively German could evade the workers' participation requirement
by incorporating in another European country.
Numerous arguments also have been leveled against the corporate seat
theory. As with many theoretical controversies, the majority of these arguments either have been invalidated by subsequent developments in the
theory or have not been sufficiently persuasive to challenge the theory's
legitimacy as a "second-best" choice. Nevertheless, a close analysis raises
serious doubts about both the theory's soundness as well as the appropriateness of certain results of its application.
Theoretically, the corporate seat concept suffers from contradictions
that arise from the efforts of its advocates to cover cases that otherwise
would be subject to a law other than that of the forum. For example, the
German law relating to groupings of enterprises (Konzernrecht), which
is aimed at protecting the corporate position of minority shareholders
and creditors of subsidiaries against the specific risks which might
emerge from their status of subordination, 20 applies to relations between
a foreign parent company and its German subsidiary. While this point is
not disputed by legal commentators,21 their methods of reasoning may
follow different paths.22 The majority opinion determines the application
19.
20.

See infra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.

21.

See 1 H.
See, e.g.,

22.

See id. For detailed presentations of the different paths, see Wiedemann, Inter-

WIEDEMANN, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT
STAUDINGER-GROSSFELD,

nationales Gesellschaftsrecht, in

INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT UND RECHTSVER-

GLEICHUNG IM AUSGANG DES 20. JAHRHUNDERTS

Art. 10, in 7

801 (1980).

supra note 12, para. 390.
197, 203-06 (1977); Ebenroth, Nach

MONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, paras.

338-47 (1983) [hereinafter MONCHKOMM-EBENROTH].
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of the law concerning groups of enterprises according to the same criterion as the law governing corporate affairs-the location of the corporation's effective seat. Pursuant to this view there is a sort of "reflection"
of the law governing the corporate affairs of the subsidiary over the parent company, by setting limits on the discretionary powers of the latter.2"
While the concept seems to work in decentralized groups of companies, a
subsidiary which has entered into a so-called "contract of domination"
under section 291(1) of the German Stock Corporation Law 4 loses its
autonomy of planning and is directed from abroad by the parent company. This means that the seat of the subsidiary is not in Germany but
in the state in which its parent is located and the law that governs its
corporate affairs should not be German. Consequently, the German law
concerning groups of corporations also could not be applicable since
there is no "reflection" of German law over the foreign parent.
The reaction of the effective seat theorists to this fallacy was to modify
the notion of the seat in'
a way that would permit the application of
German law. The location of the seat had to shift from the place at
which the important policy directives are adopted to the place at which
these directives are transformed into "everyday administrative decisions. '" 25 Although this solution ensures that forum law is applicable and
solves the problem of determining the seat of corporations with headquarters in more than one country,2 6 it contradicts the effective seat concept, which is supposed to focus on the "nerve center" of the corporation.
Moreover, this kind of overlapping of the effective seat with the registered seat overlooks the fact that the basic assumption of the seat the-

23.

1 H.

WIEDEMANN,

supra note 20, at 800 & n.1, 801; cf. Rebbinder, Das auf

multinationaleUnternehmen anwendbareRecht, in DEUTSCHE ZIVIL- UND KOLLISIONSRECHTLICHE BErrRXGE ZUM IX. INTERNATIONALEN KONGRESS FOR REcHTSvER-

1974, at 122, 124-29 (1974).
24. Aktiengesetz [AktG] § 291(1), 1965 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 1089 (W. Ger.).
25. STAUDINGER-GROSSFELD, supra note 12, para. 168 (quoting Sandrock); see also
MONCHKOMM-EBENROTH, supra note 22, para. 155; Soergel-Liideritz, Vor Art. 7,
GLEICHUNG IN TEHERAN

Einfihrungsgesetz,

BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH,

8

KOHLHAMMER-KOMMENTAR,

para.

210 (11th ed. 1983) [hereinafter SOERGEL-LtIDERrrz]. But see, e.g., Soergel-Kegel, Art.
7, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, 7 KOHLHAMMER-KOMMENTAR, para. 151 (10th ed.
1970), where a seat is defined as "the corporate headquarters at which the greatest num-

ber and most important decisions are regularly made." This definition is criticized in
Sandrock, Die multinationalen Korporationen im internationalen Privatrecht, in INTERNATIONALRECHTLICHE PROBLEME MULTINATIONALER KORPORATIONEN

169, 181

n.17 (1978).
26. Famous examples include: Agfa-Gevaert, VFQ-Fokker, Royale Dutch-Shell,
Unilever and Hoesch-Hoogovens. See generally G. GRASMANN, SYSTEM DES INTERNATIONALEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS, paras. 371-79 (1970).
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ory-that the state in which the corporate seat is located is the one most
affected by its activities because more directors, officers, privileged shareholders and creditors would be domiciled there-proves unworkable in
cases of subsidiaries of foreign parent companies, where most of the
shareholders, directors and officers are usually domiciled outside the
27
forum.
Another criticism of the seat theory is that while it claims to protect
the interests of the forum, it does not prevent the circumvention of statutes, even those with a very important social and political content, such
as the German law on workers' co-determination.28 This law provides
for an equal number of shareholders' representatives on the one hand,
and employees and union representatives on the other, on the supervisory
board (Aufsichtsrat) of corporations whose number of employees exceeds
two thousand.
The application of the co-determination law to groups of corporations,
including both German and foreign companies, is one of the most actively disputed problems in German economic law. 9 Two different aspects of the problem should be distinguished: that concerning co-determination in a group of corporations in which the subsidiary is German and
the parent company is located in a third country, and that where the
parent is a German company. In the latter case, the debated questions
are whether the employees of foreign subsidiaries have the right to elect
27. See H.-G.

KOPPENSTEINER, INTERNATIONALE UNTERNEHMEN IM DEUTSCHEN

124 (1971); Kozyris, CorporateWars and Choice of Law, 1985
L.J. 1, 53.
28. Gesetze iber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer, 1976 BGBI 1 1153 (W.
Ger.). See generally Vorbrugg, Labor Participationin German Companies and Its European Context, 11 INT'L LAW. 249 (1977).
29. See DiubIer, Mitbestimmung und Betriebsverfassung im internationalenPrivatrecht, 39 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 444 (1975); Grasmann, Internationale Probleme der Mitbestimmung, 3 ZEITSCHRIF-r FOR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELISCHAFTSRECHT 317 (1973);
M. PRAGER, GRENZEN DER DEUTSCHEN MITBESTIMMUNG (INKLUSIVE BETRIEBSVERFASSUNG) IM DEUTSCH-SCHWEIZERISCHEN UNTERNEHMENSRECHT (1979); Birk,
Multinationale Unternehmen und internationales Arbeitsrecht, in INTERNATIONALRECHTLICHE PROBLEME MULTINATIONALER KORPORATIONEN 263 (1978); Duden,
Zur Mitbestimmung in Konzernverh~iltnissen nach dem Mitbestimmungsgesetz, 141
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR]
145 (1977); Martens, Mitbestimmung, Konzernbildung und Gesellschaftseinfluss, 138
ZHR 179 (1974); Bernstein & Koch, InternationalerKonzern und deutsche Mitbestimmung, 143 ZHR 522 (1979); H. VON ZrTzEwrrz, DIE VEREINBARKErr INTERNATIONALER VERTRAGSKONZERNE MIT DEM MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ 1976 (1980); Ebenroth
& Sura, TransnationaleUnternehmen und deutsches Mitbestimmungsgesetz, 144 ZHR
610 (1980).
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT
DUKE
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and to be elected to the supervisory board of the German parent and, if
not, whether they can be included in the total number of employees of
the group for the purpose of activating the law.3 0 These questions, however, are not highly relevant from the point of view of the applicability of
the workers' participation law, since the law remains in effect even without the participation of employees working abroad when the numerical
criterion is met by employees in Germany. The situation is different if
the parent company and the German subsidiary have entered into a contract of domination under section 291(1) of the German Stock Corporation Law"1 because such a contract enables the parent to give binding
orders to the board of directors of the subsidiary. 2 The board has the
right to refuse the order only when it obviously runs contrary to the
interests of the parent company or to the whole group.3" Even where the
parent's order meets objections from the supervisory board of the subsidiary, the order nevertheless can be implemented if the management of the
parent repeats the order.3 '
The powers given to the parent company under section 308 would
enable it to eliminate the co-determination rights of the subsidiary's employees with comparative ease. German commentators unwilling to accept this conclusion continue to react to contracts of domination in various ways. Thus, it is suggested de lege ferenda that section 308(3)
should be modified to enable the supervisory board of the subsidiary to
veto orders of the parent company 5 while it is argued de lege lata that
contracts of domination between German subsidiaries and foreign parent
corporations should be regarded as invalid as an infringement upon the
national sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany and as an unreasonable restriction upon the rights of shareholders, creditors and employees of the subordinate company.3 6 Some authors do not advocate the
per se invalidity of contracts of domination with foreign parent companies, but only in circumstances where the workers' right to participate in
the parent's management is not granted.37 Finally, an alternative solution differing fundamentally from the aforementioned calls for a shift of

30.

For an overview of the opinions expressed on this matter, see
supra note 12, paras. 321-30.
AktG § 291(1), 1965 BGBI. I 1089.

STAUDINGER-

GROSSFELD,

31.

32. AktG § 291(1).
33. § 308(1)-(2).
34. § 308(3).
35.

Martens, supra note 29, at 194-95; H.-G.

KOPPENSTEINER,

supra note 27, at

250-51.
36. Diubler, supra note 29, at 468-73; C.T. EBENROTH, supra note 11, at 420-21.
37. Duden, supra note 29, at 186-89; Bernstein & Koch, supra note 29, at 531-36.
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the methodology of Private International Law towards the theory of governmental interest-analysis. According to this concept, contracts of domination enabling the foreign parent to exclude co-determination are invalid since the German law expresses a policy of improving social welfare,
a policy which Germany has an interest in effectuating notwithstanding
the possiblity this policy would conflict with the divergent policy of a
foreign state."8
Despite these objections, the majority view uses two arguments to reject the possibility of German workers participating in the management
of the foreign parent company. First, the law governing the corporate
affairs of the foreign parent company is not German and a cumulative
application of different rules of law to the same situation would be impossible.8 9 Second, the legislative intent, as derived from the provisions
concerning groups of corporations, supports the validity of contracts of
domination. In fact the legislators give preferential treatment with respect to the powers of the parent company to groups of corporations
brought about by contracts of domination vis-A-vis de facto groups.4 0
Thus, section 311 of the Stock Corporation Law provides that the controlling company of a de facto group must not use its influence so as to
abuse or permit harm to be suffered by the other companies, nor cause
them to enter into prejudicial transactions, unless the loss suffered is adequately compensated."' Both the parent company and its directors are
liable for damages to the company which suffers the loss.42 In addition,
the management of the controlling company must submit a report to the
supervisory board and the auditors (Abschlussprfifer) on the relations
between this company and the other companies of the group.43 These
restrictions on de facto groups of companies are intended to make groups
built on a contractual basis more attractive because they offer better protection to minority shareholder interests. A view excluding precisely this
kind of association between German and foreign companies, therefore,
would be inconsistent with the policy of the German legislation.
The consequence of recognizing the validity of domination contracts is
that, with regard to worker co-determination, the seat theory is as powerless as the incorporation theory. If both theories achieve the same reZrrzEwrrz, supra note 29, at 108-225.
39. See Ebenroth & Sura, supra note 29, at 620.
40. STAUDINGER-GROSSFELD, supra note 12, para. 403. For a short analysis of the
status of these two types of affiliated companies, see, e.g., Zallner, Einfthrung in das
Konzernrecht, 8 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 297, 301-04 (1968).
41. AktG § 1311, 1965 BGBI I 1089.
42. AktG, §§ 317-18.

38. See generally H. voN

43. §§ 312, 316.
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suit in an area as important as worker co-determination, is it necessary
to impose the seat theory on foreign corporations, forcing them to incorporate under the law of the host state? While the seat theory is not
responsible for the legislature's inadequacies, one substantial virtue of a
theory which claims to be protective of the forum's interests would be its
ability to enforce the vital policies of the forum notwithstanding the different foreign elements in each particular case. True, contracts of domination could be considered void and the co-determination provisions
enforced under the principle of immediate application (Sonderanknfipfung). 4 That argument, however, could be used against supporters of the seat theory, who consider the inability to prevent circumvention of domestic law without help of rules of immediate application to be
a serious disadvantage of the incorporation theory. 5
The final criticism of the seat theory is the result it produces where
the law of incorporation is not that of the state in which the seat is
located. For instance, the seat theory regards as nonexistent corporations
that transfer their seat outside the state of incorporation.46 While advocates of the seat theory contend that this treatment offers satisfactory
protection to creditors in the forum by holding the shareholders personally liable,'7 this treatment is hardly equivalent to corporate liability
where the assets of the corporation are abroad and the shareholders have
no assets in the forum.' Moreover, a judgment in the forum probably
will not be recognized and enforced in a country that applies the incorporation theory and consequently views the corporation as an existent
legal entity. 49 But even where there is co-operation between the state
where the seat previously was established and the one to which the seat
is to be transferred, with the former permitting the transfer without dissolution and liquidation and the latter recognizing the continuation of
the corporation's existence under the condition that the corporation adapt

44. Bernstein & Koch, supra note 29, at 532. For a general discussion of rules of
immediate application, see Francescakis, Lois d'application immhdiate et droit du travail, REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 273 (1974); see also Zweigert,

InternationalesPrivatrechtund 5ffentliches Recht, in

FONFZIG JAHRE INSTITrrT FOR

124 (1965).
See Ebenroth, Unternehmensrechtund InternationalesPrivatrecht,in FREIHErr
UND VERANTWORTUNG IM RECHT 101, 124 (1982).
46, See STAUDINGER-GROSSFELD, supra note 12, paras. 348-56; MONCHKoMMEBENROTH, supra note 22, para. 180; Cf SOERGEL-LUDDERITZ, supra note 25, para. 242.
47. See C.T. EBENROTH, supra note 11, at 372-74.
48. STAUDINGER-GROSSFELD, supra note 12, para. 346.
49. See Sandrock, supra note 25, at 184.
INTERNATIONALES RECHT AN DER UNIVERSITXT KIEL

45.
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its charter to the law of the new host state, 50 the seat transfer invariably
involves a change in the law governing the corporation's activities. This
means that a company incorporated in England and having a cause of
action under English law against one of its shareholders, must bring the
action under German law if it transfers its seat to Germany. The absurdity of this result51 is evidenced by the refusal of some German courts
to follow the seat theory in this respect.52
Similar problems do not arise under the incorporation theory. The
principle of automatic recognition, the quintessence of this theory, not
only guarantees business flexibility, but also provides corporate creditors
with the continued existence of a legal entity against which their rights
can be enforced. 5"
III.
A.

SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES

Incorporationand Effective Seat Theory Combined?

Professor Wiedemann has suggested a potential resolution to the dilemma posed by the incorporation and seat doctrines." His theory is
directed at corporations within Member States of the European Community and is based on the formation of three groups of cases. The first
consists of enterprises incorporated under the law of the forum state.55
The law applicable to the corporate affairs of this group is forum law as
long as the corporation maintains at least a registered seat in the forum.
The rationale behind this proposal is that the forum's interests might be
affected even where the effective seat is located in a third state. Its application allows the transfer of the effective seat out of the forum, without
changing the law governing corporate affairs.
The second group encompasses enterprises incorporated under the law
of an EC Member State. 56 Unlike the previous group, whose classifica50. See Grossfeld, Die Anerkennung der Rechtsfdhigkeit juristischerPersonen, 31
1, 35-36 (1967).
51. F.A. MANN, Bemerkungen zum InternationalenPrivatrechtder Aktiengesellschaft und des Konzerns, in BEITRXGE ZUM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT 70, 72
RABELSZ

(1976).
52. See, e.g., Judgment of August 28, 1970, Oberlandesgericht, Hamburg, 16 AusSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBS-BERATERS 518 (1970) (transfer of the corporate
seat outside Germany without more is insufficient to make German law inapplicable).

53. See Vischer, Die Wandlung des Gesellschaftsrechtszu einem Unternehmensrecht
und die Konsequenzen ftr das internationale Privatrecht, in INTERNATIONALES
639, 646 (1977).
54. See Wiedemann, supra note 22, at 199-203.
55. See id. at 199-200.
56. See id. at 200-02.

RECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSORDNUNG
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tion was influenced by the principles of the seat theory, this group is
founded on the incorporation theory: the law applicable to such corporations is that of the state of incorporation at least as long as there exists
an "effective and durable connection" 57 between the corporate activities
and the economy of one EC Member State.
Finally, the corporations forming the third group are those incorporated under a law of the state other than that of the forum or another
EC Member State.55 The law applicable to these cases initially depends
upon whether any special clause in an international agreement provides
for a solution. If not, the next inquiry is whether the corporation in
question has its effective seat or its principal place of business in the
forum. If so, the need for effective protection of the interests of shareholders, creditors and employees requires the application of forum law.
If, however, the seat is located outside the forum, forum law yields to the
law with which the corporation is more closely connected. In the latter
case, "the incorporation principle can be applied without limitations."5 "
Despite Wiedemann's effort to treat different kinds of corporations
separately, his concept does not really improve the theoretical basis of
multinational corporation choice of law issues because it presents
problems in all three groups of cases it distinguishes. In the first group,
Wiedemann extends the applicability of forum law beyond the principles
of the seat theory by applying forum law to cases in which an enterprise
has done no more than register its seat in the forum. This replacement of
the seat theory's real connection requirement with a legal connection requirement which is easily subject to manipulation, is likely to create conflict among states that follow Wiedemann's theory. Thus, if an enterprise is incorporated and has its registered seat in state A, but its
effective seat and principal place of business is in state B, then the law
governing its corporate affairs is the law of A. While state B, whose
interests are probably more affected by the activities of the corporation,
will be able to refuse to recognize the enterprise, dealing with a nonexistent legal entity will not advance the interests state B seeks to protect.
The treatment of the second group of cases reflects the need for legal
harmonization within the European Community rather than the contemporary relations of the national laws of the Member-States. At present,
the proposed solution would not lead to satisfactory results, as it would
allow enterprises to circumvent the stricter law of one Member State

57. Id. at 201.
58. See id. at 202-03.
59. Id. at 203.
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through incorporating in another.60
With respect to the third group, the theory does not define the meaning of the "principal place of business." It remains uncertain, therefore,
whether the management seat, the site of the corporate activities or the
domicile of the majority of shareholders, creditors or employees is determinative. It is fairly clear that this uncertainty may result in confusion
with respect to the applicable law. 6 '
B.

Restricted Incorporation Theory

The failure of Wiedemann's case groups to fill the gap between the
two competing theories implies the need for an alternative incorporation
theory that reconciles the principle of automatic recognition with that of
protection of the host state's vital interests. Well known legislative examples of "restricted" incorporation theories include the pseudo-foreign corporation laws of California62 and New York6" as well as the Convention
between the Members of the European Community on the Mutual Recognition of Corporations and Legal Persons." From an academic perspective, Grasmann's "theory of differentiation" 6 5 and Sandrock's "theory of super-addition" 66 probably are the most systematic attempts to
modify the incorporation principle in favor of the policies of the forum.6 7
1. The Legislation
a.

The United States Experience: California and New York

The dominance of the incorporation theory in the United States,
which resulted in immunizing enterprises from the jurisdiction of any
other state except that of incorporation, led to the "race of laxity," or

60. See Ebenroth & Sura, Das Problem der Annerkennung im internationalen
Gesellschaftsrecht" Feststellung der Rechtsfdhigkeit und Bestimmung der Personalstatus, 43 RABELsZ 315, 328 (1979).

61. Id.; see also MfinchKomm-Ebenroth, supra note 22, paras. 149-52.
62. See infra note 73-74 and accompanying text.
63. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 76, 82-83 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
67. The recent trend in German scholarship towards the incorporation theory is
noted in MfinchKomrn-Ebenroth, supra note 22, para. 117 & n.319. See also Westermann, Das Gesellschaftsrechtin der Methodendiskussion um das internationalePrivatrecht, 4 ZErrsCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GEsE.SCIAsmREcTrr 68, 80
(1975).
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"race for the bottom.""8 In order to attract enterprises so as to increase
their charter fee revenues, most states tried to enact corporation laws that
modeled the most lenient state laws then existing. Whenever a state introduced a less restrictive provision, other states would immediately follow. Although New Jersey initiated the race, Delaware, the contemporary "Mecca of American corporations," was the clear winner. 9
Since the incorporation principle holds that the law of the state of
incorporation governs the corporation's activities regardless of the degree
of corporate contacts within such state, abuses of and reaction to state
corporate law shopping were expected. On the federal level, the reaction
came in the form of the 1933 Securities Act70 and the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act,"1 which regulate the issue and trading of securities and
the dissemination of information by corporations, with the regulation of
corporate affairs being left to the states. It is not astonishing, therefore,
that California and New York, two of the nation's most heavily industrialized states, were the first to enact laws addressing the problems of
pseudo-foreign corporations. In North Carolina a similar draft was prepared as early as 1955, but for reasons unknown it never became law. 2
Section 2115(a) of the California Corporations Code provides that
other selected sections will be applied to a foreign corporation if the average of "the property factor, the payroll factor and the sales factor...
is more than 50 percent during its latest full income year, and if more
than one-half of its outstanding voting securities are held of record by
persons having addresses in [California]. 173 The most important of these
selected provisions concern election and removal of directors, directors'
standard of care and liability for unlawful distributions, shareholders'
liability for receiving such distributions, indemnification of directors and
officers, limitations on mergers and sale of assets, cumulative voting, re-

68. These famous appellations were introduced respectively by Justice Louis Brandeis in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (dissenting opinion), and Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666
(1974).
69. For a historical overview of this process, see R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION, 33-61 (1976). New Jersey was the original
"Mecca for Corporations." Id. at 43.
70. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 & 78 (1982)).
71. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in
scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 & 78 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
72. See Latty, Powers & Breckenridge, The ProposedNorth CarolinaBusiness Corporation Act, 33 N.C.L. RE'v. 26 (1954).
73. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1986).
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organizations, dissenters' rights, records and reports, action by the Attor74
ney General and rights of inspection.
The New York Business Corporation Law 5 is founded on a different
basis. It applies to all foreign corporations doing business in the state,
with a partial exemption for those (1) whose shares are listed on a national securities exchange; or (2) whose business income allocable to the
State of New York for franchise purposes is less than one-half its total
business income. If a corporation meets either of these tests, then Section
1320 states that it need not comply with certain provisions concerning
voting trust records, liabilities of directors and officers of the foreign corporation for failure to disclose required information and indemnification
of directors and officers.
b. The Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and
Legal Persons 6
Under Article 58 of the Treaty of Rome,77 "[c]ompanies [or firms]
constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State and having
their registered office, central [administration] or [principal place of business] within the Community shall, for the purpose. . . of this Chapter,
be [treated in the same way as] natural persons [who are] nationals of
Member States."'78 An isolated reading of Article 58 seems to introduce
the incorporation principle to corporations organized within the Community since the mere existence of a registered office in any Member
State is enough for their recognition by all the others. However, read in
the context of the chapter in which it is integrated, and to which it refers, Article 58 is actually less radical than it first appears. Thus, according to Article 52, the progressive abolition of restrictions on the freedom
74. See generally Halloran & Hammer, Section 2115 of the New California General Corporation Law - The Application of California CorporationLaw to Foreign
Corporations,23 UCLA L. REv. 1282 (1976); Note, The Pseudo-ForeignCorporation
in California,28 HASTINGS L.J. 119 (1976); Comment, California'sNew General Cor-

poration Law: Quasi-ForeignCorporations,7 PAC. L.J. 673 (1976).
75. See N.Y. Bus. CORp. LAW §§ 1300-20 (article on foreign corporations) & §
102(7) (definition of "Foreign corporation") (McKinney 1986); see generally Baraf, The
Foreign Corporation - A Problem in Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV.
219 (1967).
76. Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons, Feb.
29, 1968, 12 BULL. E.E.C. Supp. (No. 2) (1969) [hereinafter Convention], reprintedin
3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 6255.
77. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (unofficial English version) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
78. Id., art. 58.
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of establishment "shall also extend to restrictions on the setting up of
agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State." 79 The meaning of the

requirement of being already "established" in a Member State before
one can claim the right of establishment has been defined in the "General Program for the Removal of Restrictions on the Right of Establishment." 8 For the purposes of Article 52 a corporation must have more
than a registered office within the community; its business activity must
evidence "a continuous and effective link with the economy of a Member
'
State." 81
Given the language of Article 58 and despite the limitation of Article
52, one is entitled to ask whether the application of the seat theory by
the majority of Member States is compatible with Community law. The
question is not of current interest since Article 58 is only a programmatic
provision related to the coordination or approximation of national laws
as expressed in Article 54(3) - an objective that obviously can be realized only gradually on a long-term basis. That was precisely the reason
for drafting the Convention: the Member States felt that in the meantime
a more liberal recognition practice was necessary."2
Although signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on February 29,
1968, the Convention never has come into force because of the Netherlands' refusal to ratify it. The Convention's underlying concept is interesting, since it probably indicates the direction of development for Community conflict of laws in the area of corporations. That the
Convention's philosophy does not differ much from the philosophy
demonstrated by the California and New York legislatures is also interesting. According to Article 1, all companies, including cooperatives,
must be recognized, without more, if they (1) are organized under the
civil or commercial law of a state party to the Convention, and (2) if
their registered seat is in a territory to which the Convention applies.
Article 2 extends the Convention's coverage to all legal persons other
than companies if their economic activity normally is performed for remuneration. So far it hardly can be disputed that the basis of recognition
introduced by the Convention is the incorporation principle. However,
79. Id., art. 52.
80. 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 36 (1962) (adopted by the Council of Ministers on Dec. 18,
1961).
81. Id.
82. STAUDINGER-GROSSFELD, supra note 12, paras. 91-92; Coester-Waltjen, German Conflict Rules and the Multinational Enterprises, 6 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

197, 213-14 (1976); Stein, Conflict-of-Laws Rules by Treaty: Recognition of Companies
in a Regional Market, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1327, 1335-36 (1970).
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Articles 3 and 4 bring the seat theory into play. Article 3 enables each
signatory to deny recognition to any corporation whose effective seat is
outside the territories to which the Convention applies if the corporation
does not maintain a genuine link with the economy of one such territory.
Article 4, one of the most heavily criticized provisions of the Convention,
represents the great concession to the seat theory. It permits a state to
declare its mandatory law applicable to a corporation that is organized
elsewhere but which has its effective seat within that state. The forum
state even can apply its nonmandatory provisions if either the corporation's charter does not provide otherwise, or the corporation cannot prove
that it has exercised its activity during a reasonable period of time in the
state of incorporation. Under no circumstances, however, may the forum
state refuse to recognize the corporation.8 3
2.
a.

The Scholarship

Grasmann's Theory of Differentiation8"

In order to restrict the scope of application of the incorporation theory,
Grasmann proposes a distinction between internal and external corporate affairs. While the former should be governed by the principle of the
freedom of contract and should, therefore, be subjected to the law of the
place of incorporation, the latter should be governed by the law of the
place of business activity, since it is the most appropriate law for the
protection of their parties dealing with the corporation. According to
Grasmann's proposal, the organization of a corporation, its articles and
bylaws, as well as the rights and duties of shareholders, belong to the
internal affairs. Other issues including the raising and maintenance of
capital, legal capacity, representation through corporate organs, and
publicity are included in the external affairs.85
The main problem with Grasmann's differentiation theory is imple-

83. See, e.g., Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung von Handelsgesellschaften im EWG-Bereich, 14 AUSSENWIRTSCHAF-rSDIENST DEs BETRIEBs-BERATERS 91, 94 (1968); Drobnig,
Das EWG-Ubereinkommen itber die Anerkennung von Gesellschaften und juristischen
Personen, 18 DIE AKTIENGESELISCHAFr (pt. 1) 90, 96-97 (1973); Stein, supra note 82,
at 1342-44.
84. See generally G. GRASMANN, supra note 26, paras. 615-1134.
85. Despite some differences as regards the distinction between "external" and "internal" affairs, the differentiation theory is similar to the concept that was advanced
some years earlier by Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing CorporateAffairs: Choice
of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1958). See
G. GRASMANN, supra note 26, paras. 937-41 (discussing Reese & Kaufman, among
others).
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menting the differentiation requirement. 6 Differentiating corporate regulations that have to take into account a variety of legal relationships
and then subjecting them to different legal orders will often be impossible. For instance, while an increase in capital alters the liability coverage
of the corporation towards creditors, it simultaneously, from an internal
standpoint, creates a means of shifting the balance of power within the
7

81
shareholder group.

In order to show the potential unsoundness of the classification of corporate affairs in one or the other category, Ehrenzweig 8 refers to the
famous California case of Western Air Lines v. Sobieski.89 A Delaware
corporation that did a major portion of its business and had thirty percent of its shareholders living in California decided to eliminate cumulative voting so as to weaken the influence of its minority shareholders.
The California Commissioner of Corporations found that because the
corporation had substantial contacts with the state, including a significant number of shareholders, and the attempted change amounted to a
sale of a security within the meaning of Section 25009 of the Corporate
Securities Act, 90 he had jurisdiction to hold a hearing to determine the
fairness of the proposed change in voting rights. The California Court of
Appeals upheld the Commissioner's determination and decided that the
corporation could not eliminate cumulative voting. Grasmann's theory
would classify the change in voting rights from cumulative to straight as
an internal matter that would be subjected to the personal law of the
corporation. This case shows, however, that a priori differentiation can
miss one of the theory's self-proclaimed goals to guarantee both domestic
and foreign corporations the same amount of freedom.

86. C.T. EBENROTH, supra note 11, at 365-67; MONCHKOMM-EBENROTH, supra
note 22, paras. 145-48; Westermann, supra note 67, at 76-79; Hachenburg-Behrens,
Allgemeine Einleitung, GEsarz BETREFFEND DIE GESELLSCHAFTEN Mrr BESCHRXNKTER HAFTUNG (GMBHG), I GROSSKOMMENTAR, para. 93 (7th ed. 1975) [hereinafter HACHENBURG-BEHRENS]; STAUDINGER-GROSSFELD, supra note 12, paras. 57-58.

87.

1 H. WIEDEMANN, supra note 20, at 789.

88.

Ehrenzweig, Book Review, 35 RABELSZ 347, 348 (1971) (reviewing G. GRAS-

MANN, supra note 26).

89. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719
(1961).
90. Corporate Securities Act, ch. 384, § 1, 1949 Stat. 699, as amended by ch. 388 §
1, 1949 Stat. 729 (repealed by ch. 88, § 1, 1968 Stat. 243) (current equivalent at CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25017 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986)).
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b.

Sandrock's Theory of Super-Addition9 1

Although Sandrock's theory of super-addition is fundamentally different from Grasmann's theory of differentiation, both theories advocate the
applicability of two legal systems to the same corporation. In fact, the
"theory of super-addition" is rooted in Latty's positions on pseudo-foreign corporations 92 and follows principally the regulatory scheme of the
Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons.93 It distinguishes the law governing the incorporation of a domestic
91.

Sandrock, supra note 25, at 191-237; Sandrock, Ein amerikanisches Lehrstilck
RABELsZ 227, 247-67 (1978);
Sandrock, Die Konkretisierung der Uberlagerungstheoriein einigen zentralen Einzelfragen, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR G0NTHER BEITZKE zuM 70. GEBURTSTAG 669 (0. Sandrock ed. 1979) [hereinafter Sandrock, Die Konkretisierung].
92. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955).
93. See supra note 76. A number of legal commentators have expressed themselves
in a similar fashion. Latty, for instance, was the first to draw the attention of state
legislatures to the necessity of provisions for pseudo-foreign corporations and was himself
one of the draftsmen of the proposed North Carolina Business Corporation Act provisions on the subject. See supra notes 72, 92. Baraf also welcomes state regulation of
foreign corporations. See supra note 75. Hadari suggests a selective intervention in the
internal affairs of foreign corporations with a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
application of the law of the place of incorporation or of the registered seat. Hadari,
supra note 17, at 42-49. Oldham, on the other hand, supports the enactment of pseudoforeign corporation laws, including a choice of law provision stating that the internal
affairs of all domestic corporations would be governed by forum law "unless the corporation satisfied the jurisdictional test of a reasonable pseudo-foreign corporations code of
another state." Oldham, Regulating the Regulators: Limitations Upon a State's Ability
to Regulate Corporationswith Multi-State Contacts, 57 DEN. L.J. 345, 392 (1980) (emphasis omitted). Kaplan further distinguishes between genuine foreign, quasi-foreign and
pseudo-foreign corporations. He thinks that host states should be able to apply their local
law freely to the last type of foreign corporation. In cases of quasi-foreign corporations
this freedom should be restrained and determined by the extent of substantial contacts
with states other than the host state, while genuine foreign corporations should not be
subject to host state law, "in the absence of an express statutory directive." Kaplan,
Foreign Corporationsand Local CorporatePolicy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 433, 475 (1968).
Finally, Behrens, although criticizing article 4 of the Convention for the problems its
application would create, adopts in fact a quite similar position. The solution he proposes makes use of forum law whenever a corporation has its effective seat within the
territory of the forum. In his opinion, the provisions should be broader than the ordre
public clause of article 30 of the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code
(Einftihrungsgesetzzum Bilrgerlichen Gesetzbuch), but at the same time they should be
applied in a rather restrictive way to avoid imposing unnecessary burdens on the func-

flir das Kollisionsrecht der Kapitalgesellschaften, 42

tions of foreign enterprises. See

HACHENBURG-BEHRENS,

supra note 86, para. 87.

In recent publications Professors Kozyris and DeMott have also argued for the restrictive application of forum law. See Kozyris, supra note 27; DeMott, Perspectives on
Choice of Law for CorporateInternalAffairs, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS. 161 (Sum-
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corporation and the recognition of a foreign corporation from the "personal law" of both, the "personal law" of a corporation being the law
governing its internal affairs as well as its liability with regard to third
parties. The former is always the law of the place of incorporation. The
latter also is basically the law of incorporation. If the effective seat of the
corporation is located outside the state of incorporation, however, this
law might be superseded by the law of the host state if the creditors,
including minority shareholders and all other persons having an immediate legal interest in the corporation (e.g., employees as regards their participation in the supervisory board), invoke the law of the host state because they consider it more favorable to them than the law of the
incorporation. Thus, depending on the situation, the law applicable to
the internal affairs of a foreign corporation is either the law of the state
of incorporation or that of the host state. Both laws are never applicable
concurrently to the same question.
In his discussion of the legitimacy of applying the law of the host
state, Sandrock compares the concept of commercial domicile as used in
the California and New York statutes with that of the effective seat as
applied in continental Europe. 94 Considering the arguments brought
against the California regulation, one might dispute the appropriateness
of the criteria in Section 2115"5 as a basis for establishing legal certainty
and predictability. As a corporation's business and capital structure fluctuate in and out of the lines drawn by the section's two tests, the applicable law can change annually, hindering not only corporate managers,
shareholders and their counsel in planning the organization and conduct
of corporate affairs, but also third persons who would be interested in
doing business with the corporation.9" Moreover, uncertainty about the
law governing corporate affairs might linger for long periods of time97
since disagreements as to the fulfillment of the tests are sometimes slow

mer 1985). Kozyris favors only (a) the pseudo-foreign corporation and (b) the predominant-local-interests and no-genuine-link-with-place-of-incorporation and narrowest-possible-intervention exceptions. See Kozyris, supra note 27, at 57, 60-61, 63-65. According
to Kozyris the "power of the [forum] . . . to interfere in hard core internal affairs ordinarily should be minimal." Id. at 97. Similarly, DeMott confines the application of local
law provisions to "truly pseudo-foreign" corporations and applies only the provisions
which implicate the interests of local creditors or which regulate isolated events and intrastate transactions. DeMott, supra, at 198.
94. Sandrock, Die Konkretisierung, supra note 91, at 688-93.
95. See supra note 73.
96. Halloran & Hammer, supra note 74, at 1288; Sandrock, Die Konkretisierung,
supra note 91, at 674-75.
97. Halloran & Hammer, supra note 74, at 1283-84.
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to surface, whether the disagreements are between different interest
groups in the corporation or between the corporation and its creditors or
the host state authorities. Problems might arise under the second test of
Section 2115 where persons having a California address place their
shares in trust with trustees that have no California address and who are
not broker-dealers or nominees of a broker-dealer."'
The use of business income as the criterion for application of forum
law in Section 1320 of the New York Business Law9 9 can give rise to
similarly erroneous conclusions whenever more than fifty percent of the
income of a foreign controlled holding originated from a domestic corporation. In these cases, as well as in almost all cases involving multinational enterprises that realize the largest part of their income outside the
state of incorporation, the law of the state in which the subsidiary is
located will be applied to the corporate affairs of the foreign holding.
The fact that the central administration of the holding is located in the
state of incorporation is completely ignored."'
These reasons all support Sandrock's argument that the applicability
of host state law should depend on whether a corporation has its effective
seat in that state. However, the theory of super-addition does not use the
effective seat notion to refer to the place at which the important policy
directives are issued, but to the place at which these directives are transformed to "everyday administrative decisions."1 ' This definition of the
effective seat is the same one that has been adopted by German seat
theorists who sought to legitimize the applicability of German law concerning groups of corporations to the relations between a German subsidiary and its foreign parent.10 2 In the present context, the adoption of
the above definition of the effective seat prevents the application of more
than one foreign corporation statute to corporations managed by headquarters in more than one country.10 3
3.

Evaluation

Although acceptance of the arguments against the California and New
York regulations results in the exclusion of quantitative criteria in the
application of host state law, it does not imply necessarily that the

98. Id. at 1285-86.
99. See supra note 75.
100. Sandrock, Die Konkretisierung,supra note 91, at 679.
101. Sandrock, supra note 25, at 238; Sandrock, Die Konkretisierung, supra note
91, at 683-84.
102. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
103. Sandrock, Die Konkretisierung,supra note 91, at 685-88.
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scheme proposed by the theory of super-addition is not flawed. Both Article 4 of the Convention and this theory have been the subject of frequent criticism. On the one hand, "the prospect of living under two different company-law systems is fraught with so many uncertainties,
particularly if the requirements of the two systems should not be compatible, that the affected company is likely to feel compelled to transfer
its real seat to the state in which it was formed" 104 on the other hand, it
is difficult to determine which provisions of host state law should apply
to foreign corporations since in some instances there is no clear distinc05
tion between mandatory and optional provisions.1
While these concerns are undoubtedly legitimate, the decisiveness of
their persuasive power is questionable. As Professor Kaplan points out
in commenting on New York's regulation of foreign corporations:
The contention of the Restatement and of other commentators that avoidance of confusion and difficulty makes it imperative to look to the law of
the state of incorporation seems belied by the experience of New
York. . . . So far as any published difficulty is concerned, it seems to
have been minimal. In any event, the catastrophic results of dual corporate
regulation which might otherwise be predicted do not seem to have occurred. Such regulation appears to have been viable for foreign corporations. Furthermore, there are extensive and sometimes conflicting dual
controls, state and federal, at the present time in many corporate matters
- primarily in the area of corporate internal affairs. . . .Although the
existence of these duplicating and complementary controls . . . has created
a situation of theoretical conflict, the practical results have been accepted
and viable, and the duplication of controls has resulted not so much in
conflict as in cumulative standards."
Although life under two different legal orders might sometimes be difficult and although, unlike other areas of law that usually refer to past
conduct, business law involves comprehensive and continuous planning,
the difficulties nevertheless should not be exaggerated. 107 Corporate
planners with advance knowledge of where the corporation will establish

104. Stein, supra note 82, at 1344; see also Kozyris, supra note 27, at 49.
105. Stein, supra note 82, at 1343; Drobnig, supra note 83, at 97.

106. Kaplan, supra note 93, at 476-77 (footnote omitted).
107. It should not be overlooked that even German seat theorists who are particularly sensitive to the application of more than one law governing corporate affairs are
ready to deviate from their principles in order to achieve better protection of the forum's
interests. Thus, they advocate the application of German Konzernrecht to the relations
between a foreign parent and a German subsidiary, thereby imposing on the former
liabilities possibly not provided for in its own "personal law." See supra notes 22-27 and
accompanying text.
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or transfer its effective seat can prepare for the legal differences between
home and host country, thereby avoiding "adventures" with local authorities that would be detrimental to their image. For example, corporations
probably will be willing to include cumulative voting provisions in their
charters or to adopt a corporate form allowing for employee co-determination if the corporation is required to do so by the host state.
The adoption of preventive measures would significantly limit potential conflicts, yet probably would not prove to be a highly reliable predictor of the applicability of host state law in each particular case. Predictability in business law, however, is a relative notion.'01 Corporations
usually can predict only the "potential application" of a specific provision to a certain set of facts. Rarely can they predict whether, and to
what extent, a court or public authority will enforce the law. This uncertainty is illustrated by antitrust regulation in the United States and
Europe,10 9 which often is couched in very broad language to account for
the complexities of the market process. While broad statutory language
has the advantage of covering a wide range of cases, it also makes it
difficult for corporations to predict whether certain types of conduct will
be regarded as violations. An example would be the difficulty a corporation would face in attempting to predict whether, in view of the variety
of factors considered in determining a "dominant position" (market
share, financial resources, vertical integration, ease of entry, potential
competition etc.), the lack of precise criteria as to when a certain price is
"abusive" and the interplay between "dominant position" and "abuse,"
a court would find its conduct abusive under Article 86 of the Treaty of
Rome. ° Another example would be the difficulty that parent companies
have in predicting whether their joint venture will be considered a
merger under Article 86, and not a cartel under Article 85.1' Were the
108. See C. JOERGES, ZUM FUNKTIONSWANDEL DES KOLLISIONSRECHTS 162-65
(1971); 1 H. WIEDEMANN, supra note 20, at 786.
109. See Wohlmann, Rechtssicherheit und Kartellrecht, 50 SCHWEIZERISCHE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 103 (1978).
110. Art. 86 provides in pertinent part: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of
a dominant position within the common market ...shall be prohibited as incompatible
in so far as it may affect trade between Member-States. [The article then proceeds to list
examples of "abuse."] Treaty of Rome, supra note 77. For an illustration of the
problems of Art. 86 of the Treaty of Rome, see Fuller, Article 86 EEC: Economic Analysis of the Existence of a Dominant Position, 4 EUR. L. REV. 423 (1979); Korah, Concept of a Dominant Position within the Meaning of Article 86, 17 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 395 (1980); Temple Lang, Monopolisation and the Definition of "Abuse" of a
Dominant Position Under Article 86 EEC Treaty, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 345
(1979).

111.

For an introduction to the regulation of joint ventures under EEC-Competition
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involved corporations not "surprised" when the Commission in Continental Can, applied Article 86 in such an expansive way so as to find
that the acquisition of TDV by Europemballage Corporation, a Continental Can subsidiary, constituted abuse of Continental Can's dominant
position in the Common Market? 112 Similarly, was Alcoa not "surprised" when Judge Hand characterized as monopolization the fact that
Alcoa "anticipate[d] increases in the demand for ingot and [was] prepared to supply them."' " Consider also the problems for corporate planners caused by the Department of Justice's power under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act 14 to bring an action against a merger several years after its
realization.
Businessmen understand that business is necessarily associated with
risk. A corporation must accept a reduced degree of legal certainty if it is
to risk doing business abroad - after all, its engagement in interstate or
international commerce should not be regarded merely as means of maximizing profits. Of course, the adoption of the incorporation theory without restrictions would have the advantage of certainty and ease of application. But despite the desirability of these two features in the formation
of legal principles, "there remains the question how big a price we want
to pay for certainty when a rule giving us certainty leads to undesirable
results."115
Corporations that overemphasize the need for legal certainty always
have the alternative of establishing their effective seat in the state of incorporation. 1 ' Those that are willing to take the profit with the "legal
risk" probably will be permitted to initiate informal procedures with the
host state authorities in order to solve or avoid conflicts. On the other
hand, host states can make efforts to limit the scope of application of
forum law to foreign corporations. On this point, however, the contribution of the theory of super-addition is rather weak. It applies the forum's
mandatory law, however defined, to a corporation having its seat in the
forum, wherever parties with an interest in the corporation believe this
law to be preferable to the law of incorporation.

Law, see U.

HUBER &

B.

BLRNER, GEMEINSCHAFTSUNTERNEHMEN

UND EURbPAISCHEN WETTBEWERBSRECHT

im EG-Kartellrecht,29
112.
Comm.
113.
114.
U.S.C.
115.
116.

WIRTSCHAFT UND

IM DEUTSCHEN

(1978); Ulmer, Gemeinschaftsunternehmen
WETTBEWERB 433 (1979).

Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. EEC Commission, 1973 E.
Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973).
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15
§ 18 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985)).
Latty, supra note 92, at 140; see Baraf, supra note 75, at 252.
Latty, supra note 92, at 173.
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The concept of state regulation of foreign corporations, from Latty to
the theory of super-addition, is intellectually proximate to Brainerd Currie's governmental interest-analysis.11 7 It is probably not coincidental
that California, in its eagerness to enforce a foreign corporation statute,
is one of two United States jurisdictions that have adopted the interestanalysis test to resolve conflicts of law."' Except for a note in the California Law Review in 1962,119 there have been no systematic attempts to
apply Currie's theory to matters related to control of foreign corporations. The following section discusses whether standards for the limitation of forum law's scope of application can be derived from the general
principles of interest-analysis.
IV. A

REFINED INTEREST-ANALYSIS: THE SECOND-BEST
ALTERNATIVE?

Currie's governmental interest-analysis, 20 the catalyst of the modern
"revolution" in choice of law in the United States and a source of inspiration for European reformers, 2 1 was in fact a "nihilist" view 22 of conflict of laws in the traditional sense. Currie saw interest-analysis as a
reaction to the rigid rules of the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws. 2
Before presenting his theory, Currie stated "[w]e would be better off
without choice-of-law rules." He believed that "Congress . . .[should]

legislate. . . the choice between conflicting state interests in some of the
specific areas in which the need for solutions is serious." Until then, he
believed the best approach would be to look for a basic method to integrate "the teachings of sociological jurisprudence into the conceptualistic
precincts of conflict of laws."1 2 His method' 5 begins by assuming that
117.

Baade, Multinationale Gesellschaften im amerikanischen Kollisionsrecht, 37

RABELSZ 5, 22 (1973).

118. For a survey of the choice of law theories adopted by each state, see Kay, TheMERCER L. REV. 521 (1983).
119. See Note, Limited Liability of Shareholders in Real Estate Investment Trusts
and the Conflict of Laws, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 696 (1962); see also D. KLOCKE, DEUT-

ory into Practice;Choice of Law in the Courts, 34

SCHES KONZERNKOLLISIONSRECHT UND SEINE SUBSTITUTIONSPROBLEME

(1974).

Currie developed his theory in a series of articles compiled in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) [hereinafter SELECTED ESSAYS].
121. See C. JOERGES, supra note 108; Gutzwiller, Von Ziel und Methode des IPR,
25 SCHWEIZERIScHES JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES REcHT 161 (1968);
120.

Rehbinder, Zur Politisierungdes InternationalenPrivatrechts,28 JURISTENZFrNG
151 (1973); see generally, The Influence of Modern American Conflicts Theories on
European Law, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1982) (international colloquium).
122. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 16 (1982).
123. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1934).

124. B.

CURRIE,

Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflicts of Law, in SE-
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the court should apply forum law, even to cases involving foreign elements. Where the court is asked to apply a law other than that of the
forum, it should inquire into the policies expressed in these laws, employing the ordinary processes of construction and interpretation. If the
court finds that only one state has an interest12 in the application of its
policy in the circumstances of the case, it should apply the law of the
interested state. If the court finds an apparent conflict in the legislative
interests of the two states, it first should attempt to avoid a conflict by a
moderate and restrained interpretation. If, even upon reconsideration,
the court finds that a conflict between the interests of the two states is
unavoidable, it should apply the forum's law. Likewise, if an unavoidable conflict exists between the laws of two other states and the court
cannot, with justice, decline to adjudicate the case, it should apply the
law of the forum.
Perhaps the main characteristic of the interest-analysis is its homeward trend whenever a true conflict exists which cannot be resolved by
restrained interpretation. Currie viewed "the forum's courts as the judicial arm of state government, empowered to effectuate in private litigation the community values and state policies set out in earlier cases or
established by the executive or legislator.112 7 For this reason, Currie directed forum states to advance their policies and interests where a conflict exists with claims of other states; intentionally excluding a "weighing" of the competing interests approach. According to Currie,
"assessment of the respective values of the competing legitimate interests
of two sovereign states, in order to determine which is to prevail, is a
political function of a very high order. This is a function that should not
be committed to courts in a democracy. "128
The similarities between the interest-analysis and the super-addition
concept are obvious: both apply forum law when the interests of the forum are in conflict with interests of a foreign state. However, the prerequisites for the application of forum law differ. Under the super-addition

supra note 120, at 177, 183.
125. For a summary of the late B. Currie's view, see Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflicts of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1242-43
(1963) (comments by several scholars; Currie's begins on p. 1233).
126. For a definition of the term "interest" as used in the interest-analysis theory,
see B. CURRIE, The Verdict of Quiescent Years, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 120, at
584, 621.
127. Kay, The Use of ComparativeImpairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 612 (1980).
128. B. CURRIE, supra note 124, at 182; see also B. CURRIE, supra note 126, at
599-609.
LECTED ESSAYS,

1986]

CONTROLLING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE

theory, host state law can be invoked in the state where a foreign corporation has its effective seat. On the other hand, the California and New
York laws apply where a company transacts a certain amount of business in the forum. By contrast, Currie's method does not require such
prerequisites, for "[u]nder the Constitution, the power of a state to apply
its law in conflicts situations depends not on

. .

.formalistic and adven-

titious 'contacts,' but upon whether the state has a legitimate interest in
the application of its policy." 2 9 He emphasized that references to such
contacts were inadmissible in the "weighing" of conflicting interests since
they "'casually defeat now the one and now the other policy, depending
on a purely fortuitous circumstance.' " This criticism only partly applies to the California and New York statutes because the legislature of
these states asserted that their interest in displacing foreign standards
arises only where foreign corporations have "preponderant contacts"
with the forum.1 '
The theories differ where there is no foreign corporations statute.
While location of the effective seat is one of the "connecting factors" for
the potential application of forum law, interest-analysis advocates giving
the forum the choice of applying its law where it has a legitimate interest in the subject matter. Currie's only precondition for the enforcement
of the forum's interest is that its courts have jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation. Since the rule of InternationalShoe states that jurisdiction
exists if the defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum]
such that the maintenance of a suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice,' ",132 every state in which a foreign corporation is doing business can apply its law to the corporation's affairs.
This, however, goes too far. It creates the "legal spaghetti" which Halloran and Hammer feared in California1 33 and practically eliminates
predictability as to which law governs corporate affairs. Therefore, the
effective seat alternative is preferable.'&
Once the court has found a prima facie conflict exists between the
interests of the involved states, the interest-analysis approach directs the

129. B. CURRIE, UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Privileges
and Immunities, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 120, at 445, 485.
130. B. CURRIE, supra note 126, at 607 (quoting SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note
120, at 120).

131.

Baraf, supra note 75, at 249 (referring to the N.Y. law).

132.

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Mil-

liken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
133. Halloran & Hammer, supra note 74, at 1288.
134. For further discussion of this problem, see infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
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court to inquire as to whether each state has a possible interest or policy
which would be advanced by the application of its own law. At this
stage, Currie suggests that true conflicts should be avoided through "restraint and enlightenment in the determination of what state policy is
and where state interests lie" and cites as an example Nebraska's case
law on foreign small-loan contracts. 13 5 Although Nebraska's highest
court initially held that foreign contracts with interest rates above the
limit set in the Nebraska small-loan act were unenforceable,13 it later
reversed itself and recognized as valid contracts governed by foreign laws
"'similar in principle'" to the Nebraska statute.1 37
Sandrock's theory of super-addition does not propose a more moderate
and restrained interpretation. Wherever forum law is involved, however,
super-addition implies that where co-determination is an issue, the court
should determine whether the management decision of a foreign corporation would have been different if the law governing the corporate affairs
had been that of the forum. If the decision would have been different, it
should be regarded as void.1"8 This hypothetical comparison certainly
sounds rather "adventurous," but it demonstrates the super-addition theory's willingness to accept compromises.
Should the court prove unsuccessful in its attempt to avoid a conflict
by a moderate and restrained statutory interpretation, both theories apply forum law. If this were the last step in choosing which law governs
the corporate affairs of a foreign company, the contribution of interestanalysis in limiting the scope of application of forum law would be
worthless. But Currie's teachings have been successfully refined by Professor Baxter,1 89 expanded by Professor Horowitz, 40 and adopted, sub-

135. B. CURRIE, supra note 124, at 186. For a criticial analysis of Currie's step of
"moderate and restrained interpretation," see Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment and
Better Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 268-73
(1978).
136. B. CURRIE, supra note 124, at 186; see Personal Finance Co. of Council Bluffs
v. Gilinsky Fruit Co., 127 Neb. 450, 255 N.W. 558 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 627

(1935).
137. B. CURRIE, supra note 124, at 186; see Kinney Loan & Finance Co. v. Sumner,
159 Neb. 57, 65 N.W.2d 240 (1954). Currie characterizes Kinney Loan as a repudiation
by the court of its prior rigid interpretation of state policy, B. CURRIE at 186, but in fact
the court had little choice. After Gilinsky was decided the legislature repealed the old law
and adopted a new statute containing the "similar in principle" exception. Kinney Loan
& Finance Co., 159 Neb. at 62-63, 65 N.W.2d at 245-46.
138. Sandrock, supra note 25, at 229-34.
139. See generally Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1963).
140. See generally Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California- A Restate-
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ject to criticism regarding the correctness of its application, relatively recently by the California Supreme Court,141 as the theory of comparative
impairment.
Baxter contends that the analysis that Currie uses to distinguish
"real" from "false" conflicts142 cases also could be applied to reduce and
resolve real conflicts. Under this concept:
The question "Will the social objective underlying the X rule be furthered
by the application of the rule in cases like the present one?" need not
necessarily be answered "Yes" or "No"; the answer will often be, "Yes, to
some extent." The extent to which the purpose underlying a rule will be
furthered by application or impaired by nonapplication to cases of a particular category may be regarded as the measure of the rule's pertinence
and of the state's interest in the rule's application to cases within the category. Normative resolution of real conflicts cases is possible where one of
the assertedly applicable rules is more pertinent to the case than the com143
peting rule.
Although the subordination of the external objective of the state to the
internal objective which will be impaired least in the particular case involves some weighing of interests, Baxter argues that this kind of judicial
determination is very different from the super-value-judgments rejected
by Currie and should, therefore, be considered legitimate.1 "' Horowitz
also supports this position and distinguishes between searching for the
law that "manifest[s] the 'better' or the 'worthier' social policy on the
specific issue" and "accommodat[ing] conflicting state policies . . .[by]
allocating the domains of law-making power in multistate contexts." In
his view, the "'political question' aspects" of the latter are minimized
since the balancing does not attempt to evaluate the wisdom of the conflicting policies.14 5
Since the comparative impairment method reflects natural-law premises as opposed to Currie's legal positivism, it can be argued that the
choice is, "in the final analysis, a question of a clash of faiths."u 6 But is
ment, 21 UCLA L. REv. 719 (1974).
141. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal.
3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978). For an overview of the cases which
lower courts decided on the basis of the comparative impairment method, see Kay, supra
note 127, at 591-603.
142. See generally Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CAL. L. REv. 74 (1967).
143. Baxter, supra note 139, at 9.
144. Id. at 18-19.
145. Horowitz, supra note 140, at 753.
146. Kanowitz, supra note 135, at 293.
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it necessary to go so far where there are good arguments for the comparative-impairment modification of the interest-analysis? If applied on a
reciprocal basis, this method will advance every state's policies because
each state will be prepared to trade undesired areas of control for desired
ones.1 47 It also will improve predictability by preventing the forum-shopping which the "orthodox" interest-analysis makes possible through the
rigid application of forum law in every real conflict case.1 4 Another important reason for adopting the comparative-impairment method can be
derived from the "philosophies" that underlie this method and Currie's
approach as the two are related to the choice of law problems governing
the corporate affairs of foreign companies. Professor Kay, who adheres
to interest-analysis, argues choice of law cases should not seek "to answer . . . 'whose law is to be applied?'" but "'under what circumstances is a departure from local law justified?' 149 However, the incorporation theory starts from a different point. Basically, it applies the law
of incorporation, making an exception in favor of forum law wherever a
foreign corporation has its seat in the forum and the application of forum law will advance domestic policies significantly. To combine the restricted incorporation concept with Currie's approach would be a contradiction, and would disturb the rule-exception balance upon which this
concept is based. The comparative-impairment modification, however,
does fit- into the restricted incorporation concept. It qualifies the strong
homeward trend of "orthodox" interest-analysis by attempting to keep
the application of forum law within the limits of an exception."' 0

147. Baxter, supra note 139, at 10. Professor Martin expresses doubts about the
workability of this model by asking whether the forum would not be better off if it
adhered to interest-analysis while its neighbors adhere to comparative impairment. J.
MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAws 240 (2d ed. 1984). In the short run, it is certainly true
that the benefits to the forum from the adoption of such a tactic would be greater. The
question, however, is how long the forum could afford, on the one hand, to apply its own
law blindly in every true conflict case, and, on the other hand, to expect its neighbors to
sacrifice their own weak interests in a spirit of international comity.
148. See Baxter, supra note 139, at 9-10, 19-22. On the contrary, no argument
against Currie's version could be based on the contention that it also balances interests to
a certain extent when it tries to avoid true conflicts through "moderate and restrained
interpretation." Such an argument would be persuasive only if Currie advocated a moderate and restrained interpretation of both the domestic and the competing foreign law.
See E. ScoLEs & P. HAY, supra note 122, at 18 & n.10. But the correct reading of
Currie's position seems to be that a forum's courts "interpret only their own law in this
manner." Kanowitz, supra note 135, at 269; see also R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H.
KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 272 (3d ed. 1981).
149. Kay, supra note 127, at 617.
150. It should perhaps be mentioned that the value of the comparative-impairment
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The comparative-impairment modification herein advocated follows
essentially the Baxter-Horowitz model, not the expansive interpretation
preferred by the California Supreme Court in Offshore Rental.151 In this
case, the plaintiff, a California corporation, sent its vice-president to
Louisiana to confer with the representatives of Continental Oil, a Delaware corporation, about the lease of oil drilling equipment. While on the
defendant's premises in Louisiana, the plaintiff's vice-president was injured as a result of the defendant's employees' negligent conduct. Although the defendant compensated the vice-president for his injuries, the
plaintiff sued in California to recover damages occasioned by the loss of
its "key-employee's" services." 2 California law, Section 49 of the California Civil Code and dicta in various California cases presumably give
a master a cause of action against a third party for negligent injury to
his key-employee. 5 By contrast, Louisiana law determines that the
cause of action applies only to "indentured servants, apprentices and
others who are bound in the service of an individual for a specific period
of time."1 5 4 Louisiana's policy "is predicated on the view that allowing
recovery [for loss of key-employee's services] would lead to 'undesirable
social and legal consequences.' 155
After it found that there was a true conflict between the law of Louisiana and the law of California, the court tried to resolve it by applying
the method of comparative-impairment, abandoning the step of "moderate and restrained interpretation" of forum law. The court quoted Baxter and Horowitz approvingly, yet chose to adopt the view of von Mehren and Trautman, which examines the strength with which the state's
policy is executed. 56 To support this view the court cited Professor

principle is appreciated to a certain extent even by supporters of "orthodox" interestanalysis. Thus, Professor Sedler notes that the aspects of this principle "relateld] to
avoiding true conflict, rather than to resolving it, may be useful in determining whether
the policy behind the forum's rule will be significantly advanced by its application in the
particular case." Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An
Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REv. 181, 222 n.235 (1977).
151. Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148
Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
152. Id. at 160-61, 583 P.2d at 723, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
153. Id. at 162 & nn.3-4, 583 P.2d at 724 & nn.3-4, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 870 & nn.34.
154. Bonfanti Indus. v. Teke, Inc., 224 So. 2d 15, 17 (La. App.), affd, 254 La. 779,
226 So. 2d 770 (1969).

155. Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 163, 583 P.2d at 725, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 871
(quoting Bonfanti, 224 So. 2d at 17).

156. Id. at 165, 583 P.2d at 726, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872; see A. VON
TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS

377 (1965).
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Freund who contended that "'[i]f one of the competing laws is archaic
and isolated in the context of the laws of the federal union, [the law]
may not unreasonably have to yield to the more prevalent and progressive law, other factors of choice being roughly equal.' "157 The court applied these criteria and concluded that California's policy was not
strongly carried out because California had demonstrated little interest in
applying Section 49 to the employer-employee relationship and its statute was "unusual," "outmoded," and inconsistent with the "main
stream" of United States jurisdictions. 5 This finding, combined with
the facts that the accident occurred within Louisiana's borders and that
California's policy could be satisfied by means other than enforcement of
the statute itself (i.e., insurance), led the court to decide that Louisiana
law should govern the case because its interests would be more impaired
if its law were not applied. 59
In applying the comparative-impairment method, the Offshore Rental
court considered factors that partly went beyond the scope of this method
as originally formulated by Professor Baxter. In fact, the passage in
Freund's article upon which the court based its determination of the
strength of local policy was cited by Baxter himself as an example of an
impermissible super-value-judgment.16 0 It is certainly true that when a
court refuses to apply a state law because it considers it "unusual," "outmoded,' or out of harmony with the "main stream" of other state jurisdictions, it is evaluating the "quality" of the state policies. The state has
the right to adopt the policies, whether archaic or progressive, that it
regards as appropriate and to rely upon the court to effectuate them." 1
Distinguishing "progressive" policies from "archaic" policies is not an
objective determination to which all states will agree. Moreover, the
problems arising from such an evaluation are obviously more serious
once the multistate context becomes multinational.
On the other hand, the "desuetude" criterion does not seem to be objectionable. As long as the court's refusal to apply a certain law does not

157. 22 Cal. 3d at 165, 583 P.2d at 726, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (quoting Freund,
ChiefJustice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1210, 1216 (1945)
(emphasis omitted)).
158. 22 Cal. 3d at 167-68, 583 P.2d at 727-28, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 873-74.
159. Id. at 167-69, 583 P.2d at 727-29, 148 Cal. Rptr. 873-75.
160. See Baxter, supra note 139, at 18 & n.39.
161. B. CURRIE, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflicts of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 120, at 128, 143-44; Kanowitz, supra
note 135, at 298 (quoting SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 120, at 143-44); see also
Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34 MERCER L.
REV. 645, 674 (1983).
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result from its lack of opportunity to effectuate the law, but from its
willingness to reach the desirable outcome in another way, the court can
legitimately conclude that the policy behind that law is no longer
strongly held. In such cases, the intensity of a state's interest in effectuating its policies is not judged by "objective" standards but by the state's
own conduct.
As far as other factors considered by the court are concerned, there
can be no question about the compatibility of the "comparative pertinence" criterion ("[t]he more closely a case resembles a 'core' application
of the statute - the more the case presents an instance of just the kind
of problem at which the statute was directed - the greater the state's
interest in its application")""2 since it was developed by Baxter himself."" On the contrary, Currie considered the location of the legal relationship to be a "fortuitous circumstance" which should not influence the
choice of law process.1 4 Currie's position could be attacked as contradictory because it advocates the location of the effective seat as a "connecting factor" for the potential application of forum law while it rejects the
use of territorial contacts within the comparative-impairment analysis.
However, this contraindication is only apparent, since the seat's location
does not determine which law is applicable to corporate affairs, but only
activates the mechanism of interest-analysis and the comparative-impairment method that determines the choice of law question. Once this
mechanism has started operating, the state interests, not the location of
the seat, decide the matter.1 6 5 It also is arguable that territorial contacts
assist in determining which state's policy would be more impaired by

162. Note, Comparative Impairment Reformed: Rethinking State Interests in the
Conflict of Laws, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1079, 1098 (1982).
163. Baxter, supra note 139, at 12. Compare Baxter's view with Horowitz, supra
note 140, at 753 (emphasis on the "appropriate scope of conflicting state policies"). See
also Reppy, supra note 161, at 673-74 (discussing the use of comparative pertinence in
Offshore Rental).
164. See supra text accompanying note 130; compare Note, supra note 162, at 1099
(supporting a territorial contacts analysis) with Reppy, supra note 161, at 674-76 (criticizing territorialism).

165. For the same reason, it is not a contradiction to advocate the adoption of the
seat-criterion in the present conflict while criticizing it within the scope of the seat theory. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. When the latter insists on applying to
corporate affairs the law of the state in which the seat is located, although this state is

not the most affected by the corporate activities, it usually applies a law for which there
is - according to its own criteria - no legitimation. Here, however, the situation is
completely different: if the court determines that the host state's interests are not the
interests most affected, it simply applies incorporation law. The shortcomings of the seatcriterion are compensated by the method of comparative-impairment.
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nonapplication of its own law. For instance, the interest of the state of
incorporation will be less impaired by nonapplication of its law to a corporation with no in-state contacts than by nonapplication to a corporation that is doing substantial business there. The fallacy of this argument
is readily apparent from a brief observation of Delaware's experience.
Delaware's policy is to offer corporations extensive liberties without any
concurrent obligations to maintain contact with the state of incorporation, thereby enriching itself by attracting charter fees from foreign businessmen. It is evident that Delaware has an interest "in keeping the
merchandise nice and shiny so that they can continue to sell it."""8 However parasitic this policy might be, one could not seriously dispute that it
is an affirmative policy 1 67 whose impairment is independent of territorial
contacts.
Finally, it has been suggested that a court using the comparative-impairment method, in contrast with the interest-analysis method, should
not only consider the specific policies underlying the laws at issue, but
also make sure that the application of the laws would be in accord with
the states' so-called "systemic policies." These are the same policies that
a court considers when it interprets disputed law in domestic cases, including fairness to outsiders, "facilitation of multistate transactions, and
encouragement of interstate travel. 1 68 One response that underestimates
the validity of these remarks poses questions such as: "These lofty concerns have a pleasant sound, but do they assist in the decision of concrete
cases? How and when should they be applied? How much weight do
they deserve as against the more specific policies of the forum's otherwise-applicable domestic rule?"16 The other response is to acknowledge
the need to recognize "systemic" policies but to subordinate these policies
to a consideration of the interests reflected in the substantive laws of the
involved states.170 After all, the workability of the comparative-impairment principle is largely dependent upon more general policies, such as
reciprocity.
In sum, each time the interest-analysis approach finds the forum state
has a real interest in applying its own law to the corporate affairs of a
foreign company with its seat in the forum, the comparative-impairment

166. Ratner & Schwartz, The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner on the Substantive Law
of Corporations,45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 641, 673 (1979).
167. See J. MARTIN, supra note 147, at 230; see also R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE &
H. KAY, supra note 148, at 264.
168. Note, supra note 162, at 1098-99 (footnotes omitted).
169. R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 148, at 297.
170. Sedler, supra note 150, at 193-94.
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method should try to avoid or resolve true conflicts by examining the
intensity of each state's interest in having its policy prevail, the comparative pertinence of the legislative concern to the particular case and, to a
lesser degree, the "systemic" policies of the states involved. That is, of
course, not a numerus dausus of issues that courts have to examine in
order to ascertain which state's interests would be more impaired by
nonapplication of its own law. Other issues could be added by the courts
as their experience with the comparative-impairment method grows.
Questions such as whether a particular protective feature could be legally circumvented by a domestic corporation, whether the policy expressed by the specific law is unusual or innovative, and whether this
law has an enabling or imperative character (but see once again Delaware's example)17 1 could, but need not, assist the court's analysis. More
important are matters such as the functional impact of the application of
forum law to foreign corporations, i.e., whether thereby the validity of a
single transaction or of the whole corporate mechanism is affected, as
well as the amenability of the corporate affairs in question to differential
72
treatment.1
In any event, Dean Latty's suggestion in his aforementioned article
concerning pseudo-foreign corporations should be seriously considered
within the comparative-impairment analysis. Latty tries to keep the applicability of forum law in limits, contending that "[n]ot . . .all local
strong-policy protective features need be applied to all pseudo-foreign
corporations. Instead, they need be applied only when the interests
sought to be protected thereby are predominantly local interests. 17 3 In
his opinion, the application of local law should depend on a majority
rule:
[I]f most of the shareholders (or maybe even most of the minority shareholders outside the management group) are local residents, the local requirement for cumulative voting might be applied at the request of the
local shareholders. . . On the other hand, if local interests do not
predominate, they might well be left to take their chances, along with the
predominantly foreign [shareholders], with the provisions of the law of the
state of incorporation ....114
Recall that Section 2115 of the California Corporation Code was criticized because, inter alia, its second test (more than one-half of the outstanding voting securities must be held by persons having addresses in
171.
172.
173.
174.

See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
See DeMott, supra note 93, at 198; Kozyris, supra note 27, at 63-65.
Latty, supra note 92, at 161.
Id.
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California) could be circumvented by placing the shares in trust with
trustees having no California address.1 7 5 In an international context the
replacement of "local residents" with "nationals of the forum state"
would reduce similar dangers. In fact, Latty's proposal in this modified
form seems to "fit" well in the comparative-impairment concept. Thus, if
a corporation were to have its seat in Germany and 95% of its shares
were owned by a foreign holding, under the theory of super-addition, a
portion of the shareholders representing the remaining 5% could choose
to apply German law whenever this law seemed more favorable to them.
In this situation, the forum's interests probably would not be significantly impaired by the nonapplication of its own law. In a similar situation in which the foreign parent controlled "only" 70% and the rest were
spread among nationals of the forum, should not the shareholder representing 0.5% of the stock be able to invoke forum law even when the
majority shareholders and the "majority of the minority" think that the
law of incorporation is more favorable to their interests? When should
the 0.5% stockholder be able to impose his will over the 99.5%? Does
this solution not contradict the fundamental principles of corporate
democracy?
Latty's suggestion similarly could be extended to workers' co-determinations, by making this law applicable only if the majority of workers
were nationals of the forum. Apart from the fact that such a regulation
would not find ready acceptance because of the socio-political importance
of the co-determination law, however, the problem probably would not
arise very often since the vast majority of the employees of a corporation
are usually nationals of the state in which the effective seat is located.
Finally, any rule relating the degree of impairment of a state policy to
the relative size of the interest group affected by a certain corporate measure should be limited in cases not involving interests of local third parties such as corporate creditors.1 8 The critics of Grasmann's theory have
shown that sometimes it will be impossible to distinguish between internal and external corporate affairs,1 and no attempt is made here to
revitalize it. This means that the majority principle should apply only to
members of an affected interest group within the corporation in their
capacity as such.

175. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
176. See DeMott, supra note 93, at 198.
177. See supra note 86.

1986]

CONTROLLING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
V.

CONCLUSION

The seat theory suffers from theoretical and practical weaknesses. Its
problems arising from nonrecognition, in conjunction with the progressive unification of national markets in the European Community, suggest
the need for an alternative theory that is based on the principles of the
theory of incorporation while simultaneously offering effective protection
of the host state's interests. The application of interest-analysis combined
with the method of comparative-impairment and the criterion of the
seat-location offers a satisfactory solution. Its rules are less rigid, its
scope of application narrower, and its results more reliable than those of
the theory of super-addition. Moreover, the suggested method does not
operate with mechanical and legalistic rules "appropriate for the relationship at issue," focusing instead on the state policies expressed in the
laws involved, and the extent of their impairment by nonapplication. It
does not need the "patches" of the "principles of immediate application"
to enforce the forum's policies in situations like the one arising from
"contracts of domination." Under this method, a court which finds that
nonapplication of the co-domination statute will significantly impair the
forum's interests simply will declare the contract of domination void. 178
A foreign parent will not be allowed to circumvent the policies of the
forum, just as a domestic parent company would not be allowed to do
SO.

17

0

Although life under two different legal orders may sometimes create
difficulties for corporations, consistent application of the suggested choice
of law method will increase predictability about the applicable law and
thus limit conflicts to sporadic exceptions. Nevertheless, if a corporation
overemphasizes the need for certainty, it always has the alternative of
incorporating at home. While the combination of interest-analysis and
comparative-impairment is certainly a "second best" solution, to reject it
for this reason would be to forget that the search for "the best" can be
the worst enemy of accepting the good.
The last question raised in the introduction, whether Public and Private International Law approaches to multinational enterprises are alternatives, is not difficult to answer:
The corporation of today is no longer policed solely by the traditional
means of control provided by private corporate law; what is more, there
are numerous legal, economic, social and political devices and methods for
178. Cf. supra notes 38, 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing the voiding of
contracts of domination).
179. See Sedler, supra note 150, at 227.
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control of corporate power. Securities laws, control through the stock market, control by public agencies, employee participation as well as financial
accounting and reporting are but a few significant examples.18 0

The increasing presence of the state in the economic process as regulator
and/or participant "leads to the necessary consequence that international
private law follows more and more the patterns of public international
practice. Therefore, the student of Conflict of Laws is compelled to become a trespasser into the field of public international law." ' In fact,
the adoption of the proposed approach, by analyzing governmental interests, diminishes the distinction between and calls for the interaction of
Public and Private International Law.
In the area of Public International Law, national standards of regulation of corporate activities have been harmonized through "codes of conduct." '8 2 The language of the codes often is the result of difficult compromises and usually is very broad. Consequently, the fields of law for
which codes already have been elaborated are rather limited, and deficiencies have had to be covered with the help of Private International
Law. 183 Codes, by setting standards of international economic cooperation and business ethics, constitute elements of an international "ordre
public" that could be of substantial assistance for the choice of law in
cases in which the interests of two states in applying their own policies
are in conflict. 18'
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of Corporate Power in the United States and Europe, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 397, 433
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